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Fair student placement
José Alcalde1 · Antonio Romero-Medina2
Abstract We revisit the concept of fairness in the Student Placement framework. We
declare an allocation as α-equitable if no agent can propose an alternative allocation
that nobody else might argue to be inequitable. It turns out that α-equity is compatible
with efficiency. Our analysis fills a gap in the literature by giving normative support to
the allocations improving, in terms of efficiency, the Student Optimal Stable allocation.
Keywords Student placement · Fair matching
1 Introduction
This paper explores the trade-off between efficiency and equity in the Student Place-
ment problem and provides a new ‘compromise’ solution for this family of models
that always select, at least, one allocation.
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Student Placement mechanisms were modeled in Balinski and Sönmez (1999),
inspired by the two-sided problems introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). These
authors explore how school seats should be distributed among the students. A spe-
cific, and thus differential, characteristic of this problem is that schools are modeled
so as to capture social conventions on commonly accepted primitives of equity. These
social agreements are captured in the description of how schools prioritize the dif-
ferent students.1 The connection between Student Placement and two-sided matching
problems has inspired some authors to propose allocation systems to improve upon the
ones that were established in some geographical areas (Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez
2003) and/or to identify the problems that current Student Placement systems might
exhibit, and thus propose how to avoid them.
One of the main problems faced by the Student Placement systems is the existence
of an equity–efficiency trade-off (see, e.g., Example 1 in Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez
2003). The persistence of this conflict is reflected in the proposal of two (incentive
compatible) procedures to distribute the available seats among the newcomers. The
first one, named the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, TTC hereafter, ensures allocative
efficiency at the expense of equity. The second procedure, known as the Student
Optimal Stable mechanism, seeks to ensure equity at the cost of reducing the efficiency
of the allocation. Since Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003) the literature has proposed
a few ways to reduce the relevance of such a conflict. In parallel with this normative
approach, it has become commonly known that any attempt to reduce the efficiency–
equity collision conflicts with the design of incentive compatible mechanisms (see,
e.g., Kesten 2010, Proposition 1).
In this matter, Kesten (2010) resorts to the idea of ‘consent’ by some students
to avoid the potential presence of some inefficiency. The interpretation of Kesten’s
consent is very related to the algorithm he describes to reduce the relevance of this
trade-off between the two properties above, namely efficiency and equity. Under the
Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance algorithm, EADAM hereafter, the students
may consent to waive her priority over some schools. A waiver by some student holds
whenever two conditions are fulfilled. The first one is that, by waiving the priority,
she does not hurt herself; the second one is that by waiving, the assignment of other
students improves. This idea of consent has been also employed by Tang and Yu
(2014) to introduce an algorithm that is computationally simpler than the EADAM.
As Kesten (2010) and Tang and Yu (2014) show, their algorithms select efficient
allocations that minimize the presence of inequity when all the students consent to
waive their priorities. The lack of a rationale behind the consenting process prevents
EADAM to substitute the role of a fairness concept overcoming the efficiency–equity
trade-off.
Recently, Morrill (2015) has concentrated on procedural equity, rather than alloca-
tive equity. His equity notion can be described as follows: imagine that we are
employing a specific mechanism. As a consequence, Abel obtains a seat at School
1. Then, Beth argues that it is unfair because she prefers to be allocated at School 1
1 The main aspects affecting these priorities are (1) the distance between each student’s residence and
where the school is placed; and (2) the number of siblings attending the school (see, e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu
and Sönmez 2003).
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rather than being at her actual school. Beth’s objection is disregarded whenever there
is another student who might obtain the seat Abel was assigned to by misreporting
her preferences. Morrill (2015) proves that the TTC is the only mechanism that is
strategy-proof, efficient and fulfills his equity notion (see Morrill 2015, Definitions 1
and 2). In Morrill (2015), the conditions that allow an objection—to an allocation—to
be admissible is very related to the procedure used to select the allocation. This induces
that some of the placements sanctioned as just are hardly identifiable as equitable (see
Example 2).
In a framework close to ours, Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (1998) propose an
alternative way to circumvent the efficiency–equity trade-off. They exploit the fact that
some students declare preferences for schools that are not in their area of residential
priority. They propose the following procedure to combine efficiency and equity: first,
to ensure efficiency, they allow students to sequentially select their preferred school
among those with vacant positions. Then, since this procedure is very dependent on
the ordering in which the students make their choices—and thus very inequitable—
select the ordering in which the selections are made at random, by drawing a fair
raffle among all the possible orderings. This mechanism, known as the Random Serial
Dictatorship, combines ex-post efficiency and ex-ante equity. Nevertheless, as pointed
out by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), the Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism
fails to be ex-ante efficient. Furthermore, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) establish the
incompatibility of the two appealing normative properties from an ex-ante perspective.
Our approach in the present paper departs from the above-mentioned analysis. Our
aim is not to propose a systematic way to select efficient allocations that are not
questionable in terms of equity.2 Our objective is to find a weakening of equity that
turns out to be compatible with efficiency.
To describe how we reach our target it might be relevant to go back to the origins
of this literature. As we pointed out, the growth of the literature on Student Placement
is related to the analysis of two-sided matching mechanisms. The idea of justified
envy, as defined by Balinski and Sönmez (1999), is borrowed from the notion of
pairwise stability introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). This connection invites to
explore how some classical ideas of stability, weaker than that of the core, might be
re-interpreted in terms of weak equity in the Student Placement framework to elude
the disconnection between efficiency and (weak) equity. Therefore, we discuss how
to state whether an individual’s objection is admissible.3
In this paper, we propose a notion of weak equity that follows the idea of absence
of envy introduced by Foley (1967).4 To illustrate whether an allocation is weakly
equitable or not, let us assume that this allocation has been proposed. A student can
2 For completeness we will describe, in the Appendix, one of such procedures.
3 This approach, introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1964), is in the origin of a wide literature studying
different weak notions of stability in co-operative games. In particular, the logic process described in Zhou
(1994) to define its Bargaining Set is the closest to our notion of equity. Related to stability notions in
marriage problems, Klijn and Massó (2003) propose a weak stability notion also inspired by the Zhou’s
Bargaining Set.
4 Remark 1 discusses the main differences between justified envy, as defined by Balinski and Sönmez
(1999), and our weak equity.
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object to this allocation by proposing an alternative allocation assigning her to a
school where she has priority (with respect to some of the students previously assigned
to that school). Then, the society should evaluate whether the objection is accepted
or not. The proposal is defeated, and thus the objection is not accepted, whenever
some student can present a new objection to the previous one formulated in the same
terms. Otherwise, the objection is admissible. We consider that an allocation is almost-
equitable, or α-equitable henceforth, whenever no student is able to object to it, by
proposing an alternative allocation which cannot be objected in the same terms. We
prove, Theorem 1, the existence of efficient, α-equitable allocations. Recall that under
equity, as defined by Balinski and Sönmez (1999), such an existence cannot be granted.
A further question that we deal with is how strong our equity property is. In Theorem 2
we show that α-equity is a weaker condition of equity, which overcomes the trade-
off with efficiency: whenever we restrict to efficient allocations, α-equity and equity
coincide unless no equitable allocation exists.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 introduces the basic
model. α-equity is defined in Sect. 3, which also contains our main results. Finally,
Sect. 4 concludes. The proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The framework
A group of n students has to be distributed among m different schools. The set I =
{1, . . . , i, . . . , n} stands for the set of students, whereas S = {s1, . . . , s j , . . . , sm}
describes the set of schools. We consider the existence of an outside option so, which
is interpreted by each student as the possibility of not attending any school in S.
Each student, say i , orders the schools according her own preferences i which
describes a linear preordering in S ∪ {so}. i represents i’s weak preferences, i.e.,
s j i sh denotes that either s j is preferred to sh under i’s preferences or s j = sh .
Each school, say s j ∈ S, has a fixed capacity q j ≥ 1 denoting its number of
available seats, and interpreted as the maximum of students it can enroll. To guide
potential admissions procedures, each school determines how to prioritize students
through a linear preordering in I . Pj denotes the priority list by s j .5
A Student Placement problem, or simply a problem, can be synthetically described
as P ≡ {(I,); (S, P, Q)}, where ≡ (i )i∈I is the preferences profile; P ≡
(Pj )s j ∈S is the vector describing each school priority list; and Q ≡ (q j )s j ∈S summa-
rizes the capacities for each school.
A solution to our problem, or matching, is a distribution of the seats among the
students. It is formally described through a correspondence μ : I ∪ S  I ∪ S ∪ {so}
such that
(a) for each i ∈ I , μ(i) ∈ S ∪ {so};
(b) for each s j ∈ S, μ(s j ) ⊆ I , and |μ(s j )| ≤ q j ; and
(c) for each i ∈ I and s j ∈ S, μ(i) = s j if, and only if, i ∈ μ(s j ).
5 For completeness, we consider that the number of seats that the outside option has is qo ≥ n. Since so
can enroll all the students, there is no need of describing any particular priority list.
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The central normative properties, related to a matching, in the Student Placement
framework are efficiency and equity, as described below.
Given a problem P and two different allocations for it, say μ and μ′, we say that μ
dominates μ′ whenever μ(i) i μ′(i) for each student i whose allocation differs. μ
is efficient if there is no matching dominating it.
In the Student Placement framework, the notion of equity follows the original
description by Foley (1967), in the sense that it is required that no student is envied by
anyone else. The existence of justifiable envy requires the coincidence of two facts.
The first one is the presence of some student expounding her envy. The second one is
the consent of the school proposed by this student.
We say that student i envies i ′ at matching μ whenever there is a school, say s j ∈ S,
such that s j = μ(i ′) and
s j i μ(i). (1)
This envy is justifiable whenever Condition (1) is fulfilled and
i Pj i ′. (2)
Matching μ is equitable if no student is justifiably envied by someone else.
Finally, we say that matching μ is fair whenever it is both efficient and equitable.
The set of fair allocations for problem P is denoted as F (P).
Remark 1 The notion of equity we introduce below differs from that proposed by
Balinski and Sönmez (1999). These authors also consider two additional sources of
inequity of allocation μ:
(i) The absence of individual rationality from some student’s point of view, i.e. the
presence of some i such that so i μ(i); and
(ii) The existence of an unoccupied seat at some desired school, i.e. the existence of
some s j ∈ S and i ∈ I such that |μ(s j )| < q j and s j i μ(i).
Note that the two possibilities above are related to the lack of efficiency rather than
to the presence of envy between students. Nevertheless, given that we are interested
in allocations combining efficiency and equity, our conception of fairness coincides
with that of Balinski and Sönmez (1999).
The existence of efficient or equitable allocations is easily granted. In particular,
the TTC algorithm (Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez 2003) always produces efficient
allocations and the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley 1962) associates
an equitable matching, known as the Student Optimal Stable matching and denoted
as μSO, to each Student Placement problem.
Unfortunately, there are instances where efficiency and equity become incompati-
ble, as pointed out in the next example.
Example 1 Consider the following problem involving three students and three schools.
I = {1, 2, 3}, S = {a, b, c}. Each school has one available seat, i.e. q j = 1 for each
school. Preferences and priorities are described in the next table.
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1 2 3
a c c
c a a
b b b
Pa Pb Pc
3 2 1
2 1 3
1 3 2
This problem has four efficient matchings:
1 2 3
μA a b c
μB a c b
μC b a c
μD b c a
Note that none of these matchings is equitable. This is because,
(a) at matching μA student 2 justifiably envies 1;
(b) at matching μB student 3 justifiably envies 1;
(c) at matching μC student 1 justifiably envies 3; and
(d) at matching μD student 1 justifiably envies 2.
Therefore, this problem has no fair allocation.
3 Almost-equitable allocations
As we mention in Example 1 above, the problem we considered has no fair allocation.
In particular matching μA fails to be equitable. The reason is that student 2 justifiably
envies 1. We can interpret 2’s objection to μA as the proposal of an alternative alloca-
tion, say μE , fulfilling two properties. First, 2 prefers the school assigned to her under
μE rather than the one she obtains under μA. Second, the aspiration by 2 is supported
by the school assigned under μE as described below. This objective can be reached
by describing μE as μE (1) = b, μE (2) = a and μE (3) = c.
Therefore, we can reconsider how students challenge an allocation to be imple-
mented. In such a case an objection of a student to a matching requires the proposal
of an alternative allocation. This new proposal must be supported by the school. Then
we say that the student objects to the initial allocation through the alternative one. We
only consider the objections that are based on the lack of equity. This allows us to
redefine equity as the absence of ε-objections, namely objections justified by the lack
of equity.
Given a problem P and a matching μ we say that student i objects in terms of
equity to μ through μ′ whenever there is a school s j ∈ S such that (1) μ′(i) = s j ,
(2) s j i μ(i) and (3) i Pj i ′ for some student i ′ ∈ μ(s j ). In such a case we say that
(i;μ′) constitutes an ε-objection to μ by student i .
Now, we are reconsidering the arguments above, related to allocation μA in Exam-
ple 1. This matching can be taken, in the absence of admissible ε-objections, as a
default. The question that we deal with is how to determine whether an ε-objection
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qualifies as admissible or not. According to Zhou (1994) we say that a student’s objec-
tion is admissible whenever no one else wishes to ε-object to this student’s proposal.
For a given problem P and matching μ we say that an ε-objection (i;μ′) is admis-
sible whenever there is no student i ′ 
= i and matching μ′′ such that i ′ objects in terms
of equity to μ′ through μ′′. Otherwise, we say that (i ′;μ′′) constitutes an ε-counter-
objection to (i;μ′).
We can now give a formal definition of what an almost equitable allocation is.
Given a problem P, we say that matching μ is α-equitable if there is no (i, μ′)
constituting an admissible ε-objection to μ.
An efficient allocation that is also α-equitable is said α-fair. F α(P) denotes the set
of α-fair allocations for problem P.
Remark 2 Note that, for a given problem P each equitable allocation is also α-
equitable. The opposite is, in general, not true. For instance, matching μA in Example 1
is α-equitable but it fails to be equitable. Note that the unique student that can exert an
ε-objection to μA is 2, who exhibits justifiable envy to 1. Therefore, when objecting to
μ, 2 must propose a matching μ′ such that μ′(2) = a. Now, we consider the different
possibilities related to μ′.
1. μ′(3) 
= c. Then, at μ′, 3 justifiably envies 2. Therefore, for any μ′′ such that
μ′′(3) = a, (3;μ′′) constitutes an ε-counter-objection to (2;μ′).
2. μ′(3) = c. Then, at μ′, 1 justifiably envies 3. Then, for any μ′′ with μ′′(1) = c
we have that
(
1;μ′′) constitutes an ε-counter-objection to (2;μ′).
Observe that Remark 2 above also suggest that the efficiency of an allocation might
be compatible with its α-equity. This is asserted in Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1 Each problem P has at least one α-fair allocation.
The proof of the result above is addressed in the Appendix. It is built in a construc-
tive way that exhibits some similarities with Varian’s proof of the existence of a fair
allocation in distributive economies (see Varian 1974). Our constructive proof can be
synthesized as follows: first, compute an equitable—and thus α-equitable—allocation.
Select the Student Optimal Stable allocation. Once each student is allocated a seat,
this can be interpreted as her initial endowment in an exchange economy. Since money
does not play an active role in our model, this economy is reinterpreted in terms of
a housing market (Shapley and Scarf 1974). By identifying an equilibrium in this
market, we obtain an efficient allocation. This is done through the application of the
Gale’s Algorithm.6 We finally show that this efficient matching is also α-equitable.
It is well known that for any given problem P the set of its fair allocations is either
a singleton or the empty set. As Theorem 1 reports, there is always an allocation
fulfilling α-equity. A way to measure how much the equity requirement has been
relaxed, when adopting α-equity instead of equity, comes from comparing the sizes
of the two sets of fair and α-fair allocations, when the former is non-empty. This
comparison is straightforwardly derived from our Theorem 2 below.
6 This algorithm was introduced in Shapley and Scarf (1974) under the name of Top Trading Cycle algo-
rithm. Since Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003) refers a similar, but different algorithm by using the same
name, we prefer to call it Gale’s algorithm to avoid confusion.
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To be precise, Theorem 2 allows describing the set of α-fair allocations that each
problem exhibits as the efficient matchings dominating the Student Optimal Stable
matching, except when such an allocation is efficient itself.
Theorem 2 Let P be a problem. Matching μ is an α-fair allocation for P if, and only
if, μ is efficient and for each student, say i , μ(i) i μSO(i).
The proof of the above result is relegated to the Appendix.
We conclude this section by introducing two direct implications from Theorem 2
above. The first one, Corollary 1, establishes that the Student Optimal Stable match-
ing is the unique allocation (if any) combining efficiency and equity. The second one,
Corollary 2, reports that when a fair matching exists, the sets of fair and α-fair allo-
cations coincide. Notice that this implies, in particular, that even though α-fairness is
weaker than fairness, it coincides with standard fairness on a restricted domain (i.e.
the domain where the standard equity and efficiency properties are compatible).
Corollary 1 For each problem P, F (P) ⊆ {μSO(P)}.7
Corollary 2 For each problem P such that μSO(P) is efficient, F (P) = F α(P).
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we explored the compatibility of weak notions of equity with allocative
efficiency in the Student Placement problem. Our first concern is to adapt the classical
proposal by Foley (1967) that identifies equity of an allocation with the absence of
envy, i.e. no student envies someone else’s seat.
Our approach distinguishes between objections in terms of Pareto improvements
and those that are justified because of merely inequality aspects. This distinction sim-
plifies a proper normative analysis based on efficiency and/or equity from an allocative
perspective.
Since efficiency and equity are two appealing properties, but incompatible in our
framework, we investigate how the equity notion might be relaxed to circumvent such
incompatibility. By adapting the idea of ‘resentment’ (see Rawls 1971, pg. 533), we
propose a notion of ‘almost’-equity that can be justified as follows: when a student
claims that the allocation fails to be equitable, she must propose an alternative allo-
cation. The new proposal must match two natural properties. The first one is that the
claimant should benefit when adopting her proposal. Otherwise, what she is proposing,
if accepted, harms her own interests. Clearly, it is hard to expect a student to object
an allocation, when such a demand opposes her well-being. The second restriction is
that the new proposal overcomes the students’ possible claims in terms of equity. Note
that, otherwise the proposing student can be criticized because what she suggests is
to proceed unfairly. Note that, when a student objects because of equity reasons, the
Golden Rule (or ethic reciprocity) ‘do not do unto others what you would not want
done to yourself’ applies.
7 We employ here, as well as in Corollary 2, the expression μSO(P) rather than the usual μSO just to
highlight that this matching is referred to the problem P.
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We find that our notion of α-equity is compatible with the efficiency requirement.
More than that, we demonstrate that when efficiency and equity are compatible, α-
equity and equity are equivalent across the set of efficient allocations. As a consequence
of that, our results complement the analysis of other authors worried about the equity–
efficiency pairing,
(a) for any problem P, the outcome of the EADAM (Kesten 2010) is α-fair when all
the students consent;
(b) for any problem satisfying the acyclicity condition (Ergin 2002), there is a unique
α-fair matching. It is its Student Optimal Stable matching.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, this is the first paper to suggest a weakening
of equity that is compatible with efficiency on the whole domain of student placement
problems. Morrill (2015) analyses a kind of procedural equity. His definition of a just
allocation does not embody our idea of fairness. As can be seen in Example 2, the
TTC algorithm fails to select either fair or α-fair allocations.
Example 2 Consider problem P involving three students, I = {1, 2, 3} and three
schools, S = {a, b, c}, having a vacant seat each. The next table summarizes students’
preferences and school priorities.
1 2 3
c a a
b b b
a c c
Pa Pb Pc
1 2 3
2 1 2
3 3 1
When applying the TTC to this problem we obtain matching μTTC, with μTTC(1) = c;
μTTC(2) = b; and μTTC(3) = a.
Note that any efficient matching must allocate 1 at c. This is because c is the best
school for 1 and the worst for the remaining students. Therefore, the conflict in which
students 2 and 3 incur—because both of them want to be allocated at school a- is
elucidated in accordance with Pa . As a result, a is assigned to 2. Notice that this
rationing yields to describe the unique fair—and thus α-fair—matching, μSO, such
that μSO(1) = c; μSO(2) = a; and μSO(3) = b. It can be also verified that (2;μSO)
constitutes an admissible ε-objection to μTTC, pointing out the lack of equity exhibited
by the latter matching.
To conclude, we want to suggest an open question related to the design of mech-
anisms implementing α-fair allocations. There are some authors pointing out that no
strategy-proof mechanism dominates the Student Optimal Stable mechanism (see, e.g.
Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. 2009; Kesten 2010; Kesten and Kurino 2016). Therefore, our
Theorem 2 allows determining that no incentive compatible mechanism selects α-fair
allocations. In this line, Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2015) explore the existence of
restrictions on students’ preferences where such mechanisms exist. Their findings are
not much encouraging. If no condition is imposed on school priorities, manipulability
of mechanism selecting α-fair allocations is guaranteed unless the students’ admissi-
ble preferences satisfy the (restrictive) β-Condition. Hence, as a natural complement
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to our results, it might be interesting to ask about the existence of mechanisms whose
expected outcome—given that students should behave strategically—is α-fair.
Appendix
Appendix A: Existence of α-fair allocations
As we anticipated in Sect. 3 we proceed to prove Theorem 1 in a constructive way.
The process can be described as follows: consider a given Student Placement problem
P, and a matching μ. By interpreting μ as an initial endowment for each student, we
can understand that (P;μ) constitutes a ‘seating market’ where students are allowed
to exchange the seats they have been allocated. This market exhibits some similarities
with the ‘housing market’ introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). Therefore, the
tools usually employed to solve housing problems might be useful to explore how
exchanges are conducted in the seating markets.
Consider a fixed problem P and compute its Student Optimal Stable matching,
μSO. It can be obtained by applying the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (Gale and
Shapley 1962). Associated with the pair (P, μSO) we describe, for each student, her
preferences for exchanging, denoted Ei as the linear ordering on I defined as follows:
(a) For each two students h and k such that μSO(h) 
= μSO(k), h Ei k if, and only
if, μSO(h) i μSO(k); and
(b) For each two distinct students h and k such that μSO(h) = μSO(k) = s j ∈
S ∪ {so}, h Ei k if, and only if, h Pj k.8
Given the preferences for exchanging associated with each student, E = (Ei )i∈I
describes a profile of preferences for exchanging.
Note that the pair (I ; E) accommodates the structure of a housing market (Shapley
and Scarf 1974). We now describe how to Gale’s algorithm is applied to this problem
so to calculate the unique core allocation for this market:
Step 1. Build a directed graph whose nodes are the agents in I . This graph has n arcs
connecting each student with her preferred ‘mate for exchanging,’ i.e., for
each i ∈ I , there is an arc from i , pointing the maximal on I according Ei .
Since there is exactly one arc starting at each of the n nodes, this graph must
have at least one cycle.9 Moreover, no student is involved in two different
cycles. Then, each student belonging to a cycle is definitively assigned the
seat she is pointing in the cycle,10 and leaves the market. Let με(i) denote the
school assigned to i , when she is in a cycle.
Let I 1 be the set of students not belonging to a cycle. Then, if I 1 is empty,
8 The outcome that we will obtain does not depend on how the outside school so prioritizes the different
students. Nevertheless, and for the sake of completeness, we consider that school so prioritizes the students
according their labels; i.e. i Po h whenever i < h.
9 A cycle is a set of students, i1, . . . , ik , . . . , ir , such that for each k, 1 ≤ k < r , there is an arc connecting
ik to ik+1; and ir is connected to i1. Note that a cycle might involve a unique student.
10 Note that we identify each student with the seat she obtains at μSO. Therefore, when i is pointing h we
interpret that i wants to obtain a seat at school μSO(h).
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the algorithm terminates producing matching με, previously described. Oth-
erwise, go to step 2.
. . .
Step t. A graph involving the students in I t−1 is generated. The nodes coincide with
these students. There is an arc connecting each student in I t−1 to her preferred
mate for exchanging, among the ones that are still in the market, according her
preferences for exchanging Ei . As in the previous step, this graph has at least
one cycle. Each student involved in a cycle is assigned the seat she is pointing
to and leaves the market. Let I t be the set of students in I t−1 being not in a
cycle in the graph built in this step. If I t is empty, the algorithm terminates
producing matching με, described throughout steps 1 to t . Otherwise, go to
step t + 1.
Note that, since for each t such that I t 
= ∅, I t  I t−1, the algorithm ends in finite
steps.
Previous to demonstrate that matching με is α-fair, we will illustrate how to compute
it through an example:
Example 3 Consider problem P involving 8 students, I = {1, . . . , i, . . . , 8} and 4
schools, S = {a, b, c, d}, having 2 vacant seats each. The students’ preferences are
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
b c c d a a a b
a a b b c b b a
c d a c d c d c
d b d a b d c d
The priorities of the schools are
Pa Pb Pc Pd
4 3 7 5
1 2 5 6
2 7 6 3
6 6 8 8
8 4 2 2
7 1 3 4
5 8 1 7
3 5 4 1
We first compute the Student Optimal Stable matching, μSO. It is calculated by apply-
ing the Deferred Acceptance algorithm. At each step, each student applies for her
preferred school—among the ones not having rejected her previously—and each
school rejects the less prioritized students among those sending it an application,
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so to keep all its seats filled. The next table describes, for each step, the applications
that each school receives, and which are accepted by the school.
Step a b c d so μt (a) μt (b) μt (c) μt (d) μt (so)
1 5, 6, 7 1, 8 2, 3 4 − 6, 7 1, 8 2, 3 4 5
2 6, 7 1, 8 2, 3, 5 4 − 6, 7 1, 8 2, 3 4 3
3 6, 7 1, 3, 8 2, 5 4 − 6, 7 1, 3 2, 5 4 8
4 6, 7, 8 1, 3 2, 5 4 − 6, 8 1, 3 2, 5 4 7
5 6, 8 1, 3, 7 2, 5 4 − 6, 8 3, 7 2, 5 4 1
6 1, 6, 8 3, 7 2, 5 4 − 1, 6 3, 7 2, 5 4 8
7 1, 6 3, 7 2, 5, 8 4 − 1, 6 3, 7 5, 8 4 2
8 1, 2, 6 3, 7 5, 8 4 − 1, 2 3, 7 5, 8 4 6
9 1, 2 3, 6, 7 5, 8 4 − 1, 2 3, 7 5, 8 4 6
10 1, 2 3, 7 5, 6, 8 4 − 1, 2 3, 7 5, 6 4 8
11 1, 2 3, 7 5, 6 4, 8 − 1, 2 3, 7 5, 6 4, 8 −
Therefore, μSO is such that μSO(a) = {1, 2}, μSO(b) = {3, 7}, μSO(c) = {5, 6}
and μSO(d) = {4, 8}. Now, we describe the students’ preferences for exchanging.
Recall that each student orders I , according the seat each student is allowed under
μSO—for instance, since a 5 b, μSO(1) = a and μSO(3) = b, we have that
1 E5 3—and ties are broken in accordance with the school priorities, for instance,
since μSO(1) = μSO(2) = a, and 1 Pa 2, each student i should prefer to exchange
her seat to 1 rather than to 2. Summarizing, the preferences for exchange are gathered
in the following table:
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8
3 5 5 8 1 1 1 3
7 6 6 4 2 2 2 7
1 1 3 3 5 3 3 1
2 2 7 7 6 7 7 1
5 8 1 5 8 5 8 5
6 4 2 6 4 6 4 6
8 3 8 1 3 8 5 8
4 7 4 2 7 4 6 4
Now, we can run Gale’s algorithm. At the first step, each student points her preferred
student for exchanging. As Fig. 1 shows, this graph has one cycle involving students 1,
3 and 5. Therefore, each of these students obtains a seat at the school that the student
she pointed got at μSO. In other words, με(1) = μSO(3) = b; με(3) = μSO(5) = c;
and με(5) = μSO(1) = a.
Once the first step is concluded, and some students leave the market, the second
step is similar to the previous one, taking into account that no (remaining) student
can select any student that left the allocative process. Now, as showed in Fig. 2,
students 2 and 6 are involved in a cycle. This implies that με(2) = μSO(6) = c; and
με(6) = μSO(2) = a.
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Fig. 1 Gale’s algorithm, first
step
Fig. 2 Gale’s algorithm, second
step
Fig. 3 Gale’s algorithm, third
step
Figure 3 captures the graph constructed at the third step. Now, students 7 and 8
exchange the seats they have been allocated at μSO.
Once step 3 is concluded, the unique remaining student is 4. The application of
Gale’s algorithm indicates that this student must keep the seat that μSO assigned to
her.
Note that, as illustrated in Example 3, when running Gale’s algorithm, all the
students involved in a cycle at the first step obtain a seat at their preferred school.
Similarly, all the students involved in a cycle at the second step are allocated a seat
at their preferred school, provided that some seats are still unavailable because they
have been already allocated at the previous step, and so on. This implies that με is an
efficient matching.
We can now formally prove Theorem 1.
Proof Let P be a problem and μSO its Student Optimal Stable matching. Note that,
when describing each student’s preferences for exchanging we have that for any two
students i and h, h Ei i whenever
1. μSO(h) i μSO(i); or
2. μSO(h) = μSO(i) = s j ∈ S ∪ {so} and h Pj i .
In particular, this implies that if μSO(h) = μSO(i) = s j ∈ S∪{so} and h Pj i , for each
student, say k, h Ek i . Therefore, two agents having a seat at the same school under
μSO will not obtain a definitive seat, when running Gale’s algorithm, at the same step.
Moreover, since no student leaves the market at some step if she does not belong
to a cycle, and each student points her best ‘student for exchanging’ according her
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preferences, we have that, for each i ,
με(i) i μSO(i).
Now, assume that με is not α-fair. Since, as previously reported, it is efficient, it
must fail to be α-equitable. Then, there should be a student i and a matching μ′
such that (i;μ′) constitutes an admissible ε-objection to με. This implies that there is
s j = μ′(i) i με(i) i μSO(i), and thus s j ∈ S. Therefore, by the Blocking Lemma
(Martínez et al. 2010, Theorem 1), matching μ fails to be equitable, which contradicts
that ε-objection (i;μ′) to με was admissible. unionsq
Appendix B: Identifying the set of α-fair allocations
We now deal with proving Theorem 2. It establishes that, for a given problem P,
matching μ is α-fair if, and only if, it is efficient and, for each student i ,
μ(i) i μSO(i). (3)
Note that, since α-equity implies efficiency by definition, we only need to concentrate
on the fulfillment of Condition (3) above.
Proof For a given problem P, let μSO be its Student Optimal Stable matching. Let μ
be an α-fair matching. Therefore, it is efficient. Assume μ does not fulfill Condition
(3) above. Then, there should be a student i such that
μSO(i) i μ(i). (4)
Note that this implies that there is some s j ∈ S such that s j = μSO(i). Otherwise,
μ is dominated by matching μ′ such that μ′(i) = so and, for each student h 
= i ,
μ′(h) = μ(h).
Efficiency also implies that |μ(s j )| = q j . Otherwise, μ is dominated by matching
μ′′ such that μ′′(i) = s j and, for each student h 
= i , μ′′(h) = μ(h). Moreover,
α-equity of μ implies that for each h ∈ μ(s j ), h Pj i . Note that, otherwise, (i;μSO)
constitutes an admissible ε-objection to μ.
Since i ∈ μSO(s j )\μ(s j ) and |μ(s j )| = q j , there should be a student h ∈
μ(s j )\μSO(s j ). Since h Pj i and μSO is equitable, it must be the case that μSO(h) h
μ(h), i.e. Condition (4) is also fulfilled for agent h.
By applying an iterative reasoning, and taking into account that the number of
schools is finite, there is an ordered set of students {it }Tt=1 and schools {st }Tt=1, with
T ≤ m, such that for each t (modulo T ),
(a) μ(it ) = st ;
(b) μSO(it ) = st+1; and
(c) st+1 it st .
Note that the above implies that μ fails to be efficient. In fact, it is dominated by
matching μ′ such that for each i ∈ {it }Tt=1, μ′(i) = μSO(i) and, for each h /∈ {it }Tt=1,
μ′(h) = μ(h). A contradiction.
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Now, consider μ, an efficient matching that satisfies Condition (3). Assume that μ
fails to be α-fair. Then, there should be a student i and matching μ′ constituting an
admissible ε-objection to μ. This implies that
μ′(i) i μ(i) i μSO(i). (5)
Note that, in particular, Condition (5) implies that there is some s j ∈ S such that
s j = μ′(i). Therefore, by the Blocking Lemma (Martínez et al. 2010), μ′ fails to be
equitable. Therefore, (i;μ′) fails to be admissible as an ε-objection to μ. A contradic-
tion. unionsq
References
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2009). Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching
with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. American Economic Review, 99, 1954–
1978.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., & Sönmez, T. (1998). Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endow-
ments in house allocation problems. Econometrica, 66, 689–701.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach. American Eco-
nomic Review, 93, 729–747.
Alcalde, J., & Romero-Medina, A. (2011). Re-reforming the Bostonian system: A novel approach to the
school allocation problem. MPRA Paper 28206, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Alcalde, J., & Romero-Medina, A. (2015). Strategy-proof fair school placement. QM&ET Working Paper
Series, n. 14-01.
Aumann, R. J., & Maschler, M. B. (1964). The bargaining set of cooperative games. In M. Dresher, L. S.
Shapley, & A. Tucker (Eds.), Advances in game theory. Annals of mathematics study (Vol. 52, pp.
443–476). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Balinski, M., & Sönmez, T. (1999). A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement. Journal of Economic
Theory, 84, 73–94.
Bogomolnaia, A., & Moulin, H. (2001). A new solution to the random assignment problem. Journal of
Economic Theory, 100, 295–328.
Ergin, H. I. (2002). Efficient resource allocation on the basis of priorities. Econometrica, 70, 2489–2497.
Foley, D. K. (1967). Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Economic Essays, 7, 45–98.
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical
Monthly, 69, 9–15.
Kesten, O. (2010). School choice with consent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125, 1297–1348.
Kesten, O., & Kurino, M. (2016). Do outside options matter in matching? A new perspective on the trade-offs
in student assignment. University of Tsukuba Discussion Paper Series, n. 1342.
Klijn, F., & Massó, J. (2003). Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model. Games and
Economic Behavior, 42, 91–100.
Martínez, R., Massó, J., Neme, A., & Oviedo, J. (2010). The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching
model. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 46, 937–949.
Morrill, T. (2015). Making just school assignments. Games and Economic Behavior, 92, 18–27.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press of America.
Shapley, L. S., & Scarf, H. (1974). On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1,
23–37.
Tang, Q., & Yu, J. (2014). A new perspective on Kesten’s school choice with consent idea. Journal of
Economic Theory, 154, 543–561.
Varian, H. R. (1974). Equity, envy, and efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory, 9, 63–91.
Zhou, L. (1994). A new bargaining set of an N-person game and endogenous coalition formation. Games
and Economic Behavior, 6, 512–526.
15
